Roundup: Incentives and outcomes of electoral systems

After four days of electoral reform committee hearings, the general sense that we’ve come away with is that academics in favour of reform are in favour of their own particular models, and that’s really been about it. (Kady O’Malley’s latest liveblog here). The most discussion that seems to have come out about outcomes from different electoral systems has been largely that one professor said the research hasn’t shown that everything will be sunshine and rainbows if we adopt a new system as each system has their own problems, and a lot of back-and-forth about how other systems will magically result in more compromise and nicer politics will somehow come out of it in the end (against all logic or evidence).

It was with some surprise that I noted that Fraser Institute of all places probably had the most to contribute to the discussion this week with the release of an academic essay (which appears to be the chapter in a forthcoming volume) that actually tested some of the outcomes and incentives for different electoral systems against fiscal policies of countries. While I didn’t find the results all that surprising, others might – that systems that result in more parties and more coalitions tend to have public spending as a far higher percentage of GDP, and much bigger deficits than countries with plurality/majoritarian systems like ours currently.

The logic is fairly simple and the research in the essay proves it – that coalition governments tend to be higher-spending because they require buying off the various parties in said coalitions; higher spending means growth of the public sector, and or deficits. There was also some more serious discussion than I’ve seen all week about the incentives to create smaller parties in PR systems than in plurality/majoritarian systems, where the coalition is more internal to the party, because the need for a coalition gives small and single-issue parties greater power and leverage to make demands as a coalition partner, thus incentivising the creation of more parties. This is not an insignificant consideration when it comes to outcomes from different voting systems, and I hope that this particular essay gets some traction rather than just being shrugged off as yet another Fraser Institute report.

Good reads:

  • MPs heard from the deputy minister of Public Works about the Phoenix pay debacle, while the minister was on Power & Politics with some blunt assessments.
  • Incidentally, CBC also spoke to the Clerk of the Privy Council about the twin gong shows that are Phoenix and Shared Services Canada.
  • PMO isn’t confirming allegations that Hunter Tootoo had an inappropriate relationship with a staffer and that’s why he’s not coming back to caucus.
  • Niki Ashton says the government needs to nationalise the Port of Churchill as its private owners are prepared to shutter it.
  • The head of TransCanada says that the pipeline spill in Saskatchewan is going to create more scepticism of pipelines going forward. Gosh, you think?
  • There is a battle brewing over warship designs and intellectual property concerns around them.
  • The person the government put in charge of the new Detroit-Windsor bridge project says the federal government should buy out the existing Ambassador Bridge.
  • Here’s a look at the state of drone regulations in Canada.
  • Remember that solar farm that Dean Del Mastro was working on in Barbados? It still hasn’t gotten off the ground, and he won’t explain why.
  • The Canadian Press’ Baloney Meter™ takes on Brad Wall’s statement about taking the federal government to court over imposing a carbon tax on Crown Corporations.

Odds and ends:

Here is a fantastic guide to decoding the insults hurled over social media in the US election.

Programming note: I am on holiday for the next week, so don’t expect any blog posts for the duration.

One thought on “Roundup: Incentives and outcomes of electoral systems

  1. As I mentioned in a previous comment, I feel that the academic witnesses before the Electoral Reform committee have displayed a lack of respect for voter’s rights and in particular, the importance of gaining formal acceptance from voters on any change to the electoral system via a referendum. This attitude contrasts with the apparent care and concern that New Zealanders took when they undertook their approach to reform, investing heavily in referenda (three, I believe) and outreach/consultations — before and after the fact — to reflect their voters intentions.

    Professor Emmett MacFarlane, writing in The Globe and Mail http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/why-a-referendum-on-electoral-reform-because-this-isnt-ordinary-legislation/article31205599/), argues that a referendum is necessary because “it would change the composition of the House”, which therefore “gives it a heightened importance beyond ordinary legislation”. I’d like to suggest a deeper rationale in favour of a referendum.

    It was raised by Professor André Blais from the Université de Montréal, the one academic before the Committee who seemed to get it: our electoral system does not belong to politicians and they, therefore, should not be the ones to change it. The electoral process is a pact between electors (not between electors and their representatives) and therefore only electors can change that pact. In this view, which I share, the elected representatives are the result of that contract, but not parties to it.

    In the same way, shareholders adhere to a Shareholder Agreement and elect members of a Board of Directors. The latter cannot modify a shareholders’ agreement because it simply does not belong to them.

    Similarly, the members of the Electoral Reform Committee are there because they are representatives of their parties in the House of Commons. While they can make rules affecting committee business, they do not have the moral authority to change how they were selected, or the mandate of the committee, since those matters do not belong to them but rather to the House of Commons.

    A referendum is required to change our electoral system, not because it is a constitutional matter, not because it must be seen to be legitimate, and not because it isn’t “ordinary legislation” but rather because it is a contract between voters that properly belongs only to voters, and that should therefore only be changed by voters.

    Happy holiday.

Comments are closed.